This paper looks whether fiscal decentralization is associated with trust of citizens in government related institutions. We expect a positive relationship based on the argument of governments' improved responsiveness to preferences of citizens that is perceived to result from more decentralized fiscal systems. Survey data from up to 42 countries over the period 1994-2007 confirm this positive relationship. It is robust to controlling for unobserved country heterogeneity and a wide array of other explanatory variables that are associated with trust in government related institutions. Moreover, we do not find that the positive association with fiscal decentralization extends to other, non-government related institutions. Oudheusden). 1 Deceased (Former Professor of Macroeconomics at Tilburg University). 2 Davoodi and Zou (1998) and Zhang and Zou (1998) find evidence of a negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth, whereas Thiessen (2003) and Iimi (2005) show that fiscal decentralization enhances economic growth. Others do not find a significant relationship (Woller and Phillips, 1998; Thornton, 2007) . favorable effects of fiscal decentralization, such as lower corruption or improved governance, have received less attention. 3 More importantly, other, more direct outcomes of fiscal decentralization, such as the effect on citizens' satisfaction with or trust in government related institutions-here defined as the 'judgment of the citizenry that the system and the political incumbents are responsive, and will do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny' (Miller and Listhaug, 1990, p. 358)-have not received any attention at all. This paper looks at such an outcome and investigates the relationship between fiscal decentralization and trust in government related institutions. To our knowledge, we are the first to analyze this relationship in a systematic way.
Introduction
During the last decades, many governments in developed and developing countries have devolved parts of their fiscal policymaking authority to their sub-national levels. This process of fiscal decentralization has been promoted by changes in the geopolitical landscape-such as the enlargement of the European Union and the breakup of the former Soviet Union-dissatisfaction with the role of the central government in setting policies, and, to a smaller extent, the policy advice of international policy institutions (Tanzi, 1995) . An important argument for fiscal decentralization follows from the subsidiarity principle as discussed by, for example, Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1999) . They argue that the greater responsiveness of governments to their citizens' preferences, brought forth by more decentralized fiscal systems, is believed to enhance service delivery. This improved preference matching argument is often used to point out possible improvements in allocative efficiency as a result of fiscal decentralization.
Various empirical studies have measured the potential effects of fiscal decentralization on allocative efficiency. In particular, a lot of attention has been paid to the question whether fiscal decentralization can boost economic growth. So far, the empirical evidence on the fiscal decentralization and economic growth nexus is mixed. 2 The strong focus on allocative efficiency implies that other possible that, regardless of any possible efficiency gains by improved service delivery, the improved responsiveness of governments to their citizens as a result of fiscal decentralization is associated with a higher trust of citizens in government related institutions.
Hypothesis. Fiscal decentralization is positively related to trust in government related institutions.
Of course, the motivation for the positive association of fiscal decentralization with trust in government is not limited to the improved preference matching argument that follows from the subsidiarity principle. Oates (1999 Oates ( , p. 1132 argues, for example, that "in a setting of imperfect information with learning-by-doing, there are potential gains from experimentation with a variety of policies for addressing social and economic problems" and that the conditions to do so may be better when sub-national governments have a higher degree of fiscal policy-making authority. In other words, fiscal decentralization creates an environment that may foster more effective public policies that possibly influence citizens' trust in government related institutions. Moreover, the latter may also be influenced by the size of the public sector, which Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue is constrained by the jurisdictional competition that fiscal decentralization brings forth. On the other hand, Qian and Roland (1998) point to the possibility of soft budget constraints at the local government level which may cause excessive debt accumulation and possibly undermine the trust that citizens have in the government.
These theories on the possible effects, either positive or negative, of fiscal decentralization do not cover the whole literature. We are convinced, however, that especially the preference matching argument that follows from the subsidiarity principle is relevant and important since it has been used as a basis for many analyses that study fiscal decentralization issues. For example, Brueckner (1999 Brueckner ( , 2006 uses the preference matching argument in a theoretical framework to show the effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, and Besley and Coate (2003) use it to study the political economy of spending decisions in the presence of spillovers on the local government level. Evidence of a positive relationship between fiscal decentralization and trust in government related institutions would be consistent with the subsidiarity principle and lend further support for its use in these kinds of analyses.
Data on trust in government and fiscal decentralization
The measures of trust in government related institutions are obtained from the World Values Survey (WVS) of the World Values Survey Association. Our data are taken from three waves of interviews of this survey, which covers up to 42 countries over the period 1994-2007. 7 More specifically, we use data from the 1994-1999, 1999-2004, and 2005-2007 wave. We use data over the period 1994-1998 for the 1994-1999 wave given that none of the interviews held in 1999 belong to that wave, so we have three nonoverlapping time periods; that is, 1994-1998, 1999-2004, and 2005-2007. To capture trust in government, we study several government related institutions. This approach accommodates differences in the degree to which survey respondents may experience or have knowledge about these institutions. For instance, survey respondents may have a better grasp of the operations and performance of civil services rather than of the national government because they may have had direct dealings with civil servants in their town hall. In view of this approach, we employ four measures of trust in government, namely (i) confidence in national government, (ii) confidence in civil services, (iii) confidence in parliament, and (iv) confidence in political parties. We also look at institutions that, in our opinion, are not related to the government. Measures of trust in these other institutions are confidence in churches, confidence in the press, confidence in television, and confidence in armed forces. 8 They will serve as a counterfactual or control in the regression analyses. All measures are answers to the following question: 'I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them?' Survey respondents had to indicate their level of confidence on the following scale: 'a great deal of confidence,' 'quite a lot of confidence,' 'not very much confidence,' or 'none at all. ' We follow Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) in defining confidence in organizations as trust in institutions. Moreover, since our selected organizations have in common that they all cover a dimension of government, we define confidence in those organizations as measures of trust in government. A somewhat similar approach is taken by Knack and Keefer (1997) , who define confidence in government in a broad sense by taking an average of confidence in education, the legal system, the police, and the civil service rather than looking at these institutions individually. Mishler and Rose (2001) define political trust by taking the average of trust in parliament, the prime minister or president, courts, police, political parties, and the military. 9 Compared to these studies, we employ more narrowly defined concepts of government and do not average over government related institutions.
In line with most of the fiscal federalism literature, we measure fiscal decentralization as the share of sub-national government expenditures in general government expenditures. The data are taken from the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Based on the IMF's GFS Manual (2001), sub-national expenditures are defined as expenditures on both the state and local government levels, where the state level refers to the largest geopolitical entity within a country and the local level describes the smallest governmental units. 10 General government expenditures encompass public expenditures on the central, state, and local government levels. 11 7 The data set covers the years 1981-2008. The subsequent, latest wave of surveys that covers the years 2010-2014 becomes publicly available in the year 2014. 8 There are some discrepancies between the variable labels in the data set and the corresponding description in the code book of the WVS. For example, what we named 'confidence in national government' is labeled as 'confidence in the government' in the data, but the corresponding organization is described as 'the government (in your nation's capital)' in the WVS's code book. For 'confidence in churches', churches are replaced by religious leaders in non-Christian countries. 9 Brehm and Rahn (1997) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) investigate confidence in the executive branch of the federal government. 10 Some countries (e.g., the United States and Spain) have more than one level of government between the central level and the local level. In such cases, the GFS Manual groups the intermediate levels of government together with the level they are most closely associated with. 11 Some studies use the share of sub-national revenue in general government revenues as an alternative measure (i.e., Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007) . Typically, the revenue-based and expenditure-based decentralization measures are highly correlated. In the web appendix to the paper, we perform a robustness check with the alternative, revenue-based measure.
This measure of fiscal decentralization has been criticized by Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) for possibly not accurately representing the degree to which sub-national governments have policy autonomy. The OECD (1999) and Thornton (2007) deal with this criticism and have developed an alternative measure of fiscal decentralization that takes into account various categories of tax autonomy of sub-national governments. However, this measure is not available for the whole sample of countries that we consider, and, therefore, we resort to the standard indicator used in the literature for our analyses. 12 We average the fiscal decentralization data over the years corresponding to the three aforementioned time periods since fiscal decentralization data are not always available for the specific years in which the interviews took place. Average decentralization ratios during 1994-2007 vary between 0.01 for Mali and 0.65 for China. Fig. 1 displays the unconditional relationships between measures of trust in institutions and fiscal decentralization. To facilitate a graphical presentation, we use an aggregate measure of trust in institutions, the so-called confidence share, which is defined as the percentage of survey respondents of a country in a given wave that indicated to have either 'a great deal of confidence' or 'quite a lot of confidence' (cf. Knack and Keefer, 1997) . Panels (a)-(c) of Fig. 1 show that confidence shares of government related institutions are positively associated with the degree of fiscal decentralization. The extent to which they do differs for each measure though. In contrast, panels (d)-(f) illustrate that for other non-government related institutions such a relationship does not hold, and a nonpositive one is more appropriate. The next section formally explores these relationships.
Estimation results
Section 3.1 discusses the baseline estimation results. Possible endogeneity problems in the form of reverse causality or an omitted variable bias are discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. The summary statistics of variables used in the analyses are presented in Tables A.1 and A.2 of the Appendix.
Baseline estimation results
Table 1 presents the baseline estimation results using trust measures at the aggregate level. These measures are constructed by taking country-level averages of the individual-level trust data and are the same as those used in Fig. 1 . More specifically, they capture the share of people in a country that indicate to have trust, which include the categories 'a great deal of confidence' and 'quite a lot of confidence', in institutions for each wave. In columns (1)-(8), we regress each of our trust measures on fiscal decentralization, where the first four columns present the institutions that are related to the government, and the last four columns present the other institutions. In the regressions, we include wave fixed effects as well to absorb any shocks common to the countries in the sample in a particular wave. With the exception of trust in national government, fiscal decentralization enters with a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the government related institutions. For the other institutions, the evidence suggests a non-positive relationship.
The relationships of interest become stronger when we control for the average amount of trust people have in other institutionshere an average of trust in churches, the press, television, and armed forces-in columns (9)-(16) of Table 1 . This specification allows us to verify that fiscal decentralization is not picking up a general trust attitude toward institutions. The estimation results in the evennumbered columns of the bottom half of the table further indicate that the relationship remains valid when we average over all waves to mitigate a possible bias arising from measurement errors. Based on the estimation results of Table 1 and our sample variation, the quantitative relationship between fiscal decentralization and trust in government related institutions is as follows. On average, a one standard deviation change in fiscal decentralization is associated with a change of between one-fourth and one-third of a standard deviation in trust in government. 13 Using individual-level data on trust in institutions, we exploit information not only about the respondents' gender, age, education, social class and income but also about their views on politics and trust in other persons. Columns (1)-(8) of Table 2 use an ordered response model to regress individual's trust in institutions on the aforementioned individual characteristics, our fiscal decentralization measure, and wave fixed effects; see Section A.1 of the Appendix for more details on the ordered response model used. In addition, the even-numbered columns correct for the average amount of trust people have in other institutions at the country level. To ensure that the disturbances are robust to dependency across individuals within a country and wave, we cluster the standard errors at the country-wave level (cf. Moulton, 1990) . 14 Trust in other persons enters with a positive and statistically significant coefficient which is in line with findings of Knack and Keefer (1997), Brehm and Rahn (1997) , and Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) . Gender and age hardly affect trust in government related 12 By using the autonomy measure suggested by Thornton (2007) for a reduced sample of countries, we discuss how the use of an alternative measure of fiscal decentralization may affect its relationship with trust in government related institutions. 13 As mentioned in the previous section, the fiscal decentralization measure we use has been criticized for possibly not accurately representing the true policy making authority of local governments. In the web appendix to the paper, we perform a robustness check with the autonomy measure suggested by Thornton (2007) for a reduced sample of countries. For this reduced sample of countries, we find the same qualitative relationship between trust in government related institutions and both the alternative and standard measures of fiscal decentralization. The coefficients of the alternative fiscal decentralization measure are statistically more significant but somewhat smaller in size than those of the standard measure. Compared to the baseline estimation results, however, the relationship is less pronounced. Hence, even though the evidence suggests that the standard measure is a good approximation for an alternative measure that better reflects the true policy making authority of local governments, it only applies to the reduced sample. Although it is possible, we cannot say with certainty that this also holds for the larger sample corresponding to the baseline estimation results. 14 Given that we have a time dimension as well, clustering at the country level may deal with possible problems of autocorrelation (cf. Bertrand et al., 2004) . Doing so would lead to loss of degrees of freedom which is already low and is only suggested as a solution when the sample is sufficiently large. In the web appendix to the paper, we run a robustness check on some of our results and cluster standard errors at the country level. The corresponding results do not change qualitatively.
institutions. This finding does not mean that they have no effect on trust in institutions at all. In fact, we do find evidence that trust in other institutions is affected by gender and age. 15 These contrasting findings are in line with the literature. For example, Mishler and Rose (2001) find that trust is affected by age but not gender, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) find that gender and age both affect trust, while Gustavsson and Jordahl (2008) find that neither of them affects trust. Of the remaining individual explanatory variables, only education and the importance of politics in life are related to trust in institutions, and the relationship is stronger and more consistent for the latter than the former.
The coefficient of fiscal decentralization always enters positively and is only not statistically significant for trust in the national government. Moreover, when we control for trust in other institutions, the point estimates of the coefficients become larger. These findings are in line with the estimation results at the aggregate level as shown in Table 1 . 16 Since we use an ordered logit model to estimate our regression, the marginal effects cannot easily be derived from the estimated coefficients and have to be calculated.
When looking at the estimation results of column (4) for example, the relationship between trust in institutions and the importance of politics in life is the strongest of all at the individual level and quantitatively is as follows. Compared to a person who does not find politics important at all, a person who finds it very important is 3.5 percentage points more likely to have a great deal of 15 See the web appendix to the paper for these results. We are confident that gender and age are exogenous so that we can speak of effects rather than relationships. 16 When using individual-level data, the number of countries drops from 42 to 36. In the web appendix to the paper, we run the regressions from Table 1 again with data from these 36 countries. The qualitative results are the same, and the point estimates of the fiscal decentralization coefficients are somewhat higher. The horizontal axis measures the degree of fiscal decentralization and the vertical axis represents the confidence share, which is defined as the percentage of survey respondents of a country in a given wave that indicated to have either 'a great deal of confidence' or 'quite a lot of confidence' in the corresponding institution or organization. confidence, and 11.5 percentage points more likely to have quite a lot of confidence, in civil services. When looking at trust in other persons, here measured as a respondent indicating that 'most people can be trusted', these numbers are around 2.5 and 7, respectively. In terms of our sample variation, a one standard deviation increase in fiscal decentralization is associated with almost a 1.5 percentage point higher probability to have quite a lot of confidence, and more than a 4 percentage point higher probability to have a great deal of confidence, in civil services. The strength of this relationship indicates that, at least compared to the strongest relationship we find at the individual level, the role of fiscal decentralization is certainly not negligible.
Endogeneity concerns: reverse causality
In absence of any randomized elements of fiscal decentralization, it is hard to establish clear causality of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and trust in government related institutions. It is possible that the amount of trust citizens have in their government influence the political process and in turn the degree of fiscal decentralization. The absence of a theoretical framework, either formal or informal, makes it impossible to identify the exact channels through which this causality should run though. We use standard approaches in the literature, such as the use of instrumental variables, to address this issue.
Columns (1)-(8) of Table 3 use two-stage least squares (2SLS) to regress trust in government related institutions on fiscal decentralization and wave fixed effects, where we use the lag of fiscal decentralization itself as an instrumental variable. More specifically, we measure the lag of fiscal decentralization as the average degree of fiscal decentralization in the three years preceding the wave in which the interviews took place. We repeat the analysis in columns (9)-(16) and add trust in other institutions as an additional control. In the even-numbered columns, we aggregate over waves to mitigate the possible bias resulting from measurement errors.
Apart from the fiscal decentralization coefficient in columns (7) and (8), where we look at trust in political parties, the estimation results are in line with our previous findings. The first-stage F-statistic is always larger than 10 and thus satisfies the criteria by Stock et al. (2002) , which means that our instrumental variables are at least sufficiently correlated with fiscal decentralization. 17 The Wu-Hausman statistic indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis of fiscal decentralization being exogenous.
There exists no straightforward procedure yet to use instrumental variables in an ordered response model. However, we can repeat the analysis of Table 2 and follow the approach suggested by Tella et al. (2003) to deal with possible reverse causality. They 17 These results should be interpreted with caution since we only have one instrumental variable and our model is just identified. Hence, we cannot test whether our instrument is uncorrelated with the error term. In the web appendix to the paper, we take an alternative approach where we use less strong instrumental variables but are able to test for their correlation with the error term. Also here we find that the relationship between fiscal decentralization remains valid when using an instrumental variable approach. Notes: OLS estimations. Coefficient is statistically different from 0 at the *** .01, ** .05, and * .10 levels. Standard errors are in parentheses. The number of countries is 42.
The web appendix to the paper repeats these analyses with a revenue-based measure of fiscal decentralization. The quantitative results are the same, but the strength of the relationship is somewhat lower. It also repeats the analyses with the two samples that experience a reduction in the number of countries as a result of either the use of individual-level data or the lag of fiscal decentralization as an instrumental variable. Finally, we also look at the consequences of using alternative measures of fiscal decentralization that may better reflect the true policy making authority of local governments.
suggest to use the lag of the variable of interest instead of the contemporaneous measure. The estimation results of this approach are listed in Table 4 , where the lag of fiscal decentralization is defined as above. The qualitative results remain exactly the same for all government related institutions, even though the number of countries is reduced by 11 due to the use of lags. The evidence in both Tables 3 and 4 supports, though are not definite proof of, the causality running from fiscal decentralization to trust in government.
Endogeneity concerns: omitted variable bias
The correction for a possible omitted variable bias is made by including country fixed effects in our regressions. Hereby, we only take countries in consideration for which we have more than a single observation of fiscal decentralization at the aggregate level. 18 This procedure reduces the number of countries to 20, but that by itself does not change the relationship between fiscal decentralization and trust in government; see the odd-numbered columns in Table 5 . In fact, we find a slightly stronger relationship where, in terms of our sample variation, a one standard increase in fiscal decentralization is now associated with a 5.5, rather than 4, percentage point higher probability of having a great deal of confidence in civil services; based on column (3).
Controlling for unobserved country heterogeneity, that is the inclusion of country fixed effects in the even-numbered columns of Table 5 , reduces the statistical significance of the previous found relationships somewhat. For trust in parliament, the fiscal decentralization coefficient is no longer significant, though, on the other hand, it now is so for trust in national government. A possible explanation for the lower statistical significance is the limited variation of fiscal decentralization over time. For example, the standard deviation based on the variation across countries is 0.14, while that based on the time variation within countries is only around 0.03. Overall, the positive relationship between fiscal decentralization remains valid after controlling for a possible omitted bias. Some caution is necessary though given the reduction in statistical significance.
We consider other explanatory variables that may be related to trust in government as well. Besides the degree of fiscal decentralization of the government, we now also control for the quality and size of the government. Government quality is measured by a government effectiveness indicator, which is taken from the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators. This indicator captures the quality of public services, the capacity of the civil service and its independence from political pressure, and the quality of policy formulation. Government size is measured by the share of general government final consumption expenditures in Gross Domestic 18 Not excluding countries for which we only have a single observation of fiscal decentralization leads to too large degrees of freedom and underestimation of the standard errors' sizes. In the web appendix to the paper, we run a robustness check where we look at the omitted variable bias using solely data at the aggregate level. For the expected relationship with the government related variables, the literature provides little guidance, though this is different in the case of income inequality for which there is evidence of a clear relationship. Brehm and Rahn (1997) , Knack and Keefer (1997) , Zak and Knack (2001) , Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) , and Gustavsson and Jordahl (2008) all find that trust is negatively related with income inequality.
For each of the government related institutions, we first regress individual's trust in institutions on the whole array of individual characteristics, fiscal decentralization, and both country and wave fixed effects. Subsequently, we additionally control for trust in other institutions, and this specification corresponds to the even-numbered columns in Table 5 . Finally, we control for government quality, government size, and income inequality. The additional explanatory variables lead to a further reduction in the number of observations so that the estimation results in Table 6 should be interpreted with caution.
In all of the regressions, the coefficient of fiscal decentralization is positive and statistically significant. These results imply that the relationship between fiscal decentralization and trust in government is robust. The relationship is also stronger than the one found in the baseline regression. In terms of our sample variation, a one standard deviation increase in fiscal decentralization is now associated with almost a 2.5 percentage point higher probability to have quite a lot of confidence, and around a 13 percentage point higher probability to have a great deal of confidence, in civil services; based on column (6). For income inequality, these numbers are around − 2 and − 11, respectively. The evidence thus suggests that the relationship between trust in government and fiscal decentralization is quantitatively comparable with more established relationships in the literature, in this case that with income inequality.
Conclusions
This paper looks whether the perceived improved responsiveness of governments to their citizens as a result of fiscal decentralization is associated with higher trust of these citizens in government related institutions. We indeed find a positive relationship between fiscal decentralization and trust in government. The relationship is not only statistically significant but economically relevant as well when compared to the relationships with the importance of politics in life-the strongest one we find at the individual level-or Notes: 2SLS estimations. Coefficient is statistically different from 0 at the *** .01, ** .05, and * .10 levels. Standard errors are in parentheses. The number of countries is 29.
In the even-numbered columns, we aggregate over waves to mitigate the possible bias arising from measurement errors.
well established relationships in the literature such as that between trust and income inequality. Moreover, we find evidence that supports, but not proofs, the causality to run from fiscal decentralization to trust in government. Actual proof of causality would require an analysis with randomized elements in fiscal decentralization, which so far is lacking in the related literature and would be a useful avenue for future research. Most importantly, our results lend further support to economic analyses that use the preference matching argument of the subsidiarity principle as a theoretical underpinning for their research. Additionally, policy makers that need to make recommendations on the fiscal decentralization process of a country can take into account the relationship of fiscal decentralization with trust in government and form a more complete assessment of its pros and cons.
Future research could usefully focus on providing a theoretical underpinning of more specific transmission channels concerning the relationship between fiscal decentralization and trust in government. Moreover, surveys that focus on governance issues in more detail and explicitly recognize the different levels of government within countries-examples are the AmericasBarometer surveys or the Life in Transition Surveys-could be used to study the relationship between fiscal decentralization and trust in government related institution in greater detail. Notes: Ordered logit estimations. Coefficient is statistically different from 0 at the *** .01, ** .05, and * .10 levels. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country-wave level and are in parentheses. The number of countries is 25. Additional explanatory variables at the individual level are self-reported social class and country-specific income deciles and are not shown. Base categories are female, age 35-44, higher education, income level 10, social class is lower, and politics is not at all important.
The web appendix to the paper repeats the analyses with trust in non-government related institutions as dependent variables. Notes: Ordered logit estimations. Coefficient is statistically different from 0 at the *** .01, ** .05, and * .10 levels. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country-wave level and are in parentheses. The number of countries is 20. Additional explanatory variables at the individual level are self-reported social class and country-specific income deciles and are not shown. Base categories are female, age 35-44, higher education, income level 10, social class is lower, and politics is not at all important. The web appendix to the paper repeats the analyses with trust in non-government related institutions as dependent variables. Notes: Ordered logit estimations. Coefficient is statistically different from 0 at the *** .01, ** .05, and * .10 levels. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country-wave level and are in parentheses. The number of countries is 11. The estimations contain all explanatory variables at the individual level that are discussed in the paper, but the corresponding results are not shown. The web appendix to the paper repeats the analyses with trust in non-government related institutions as dependent variables. We also repeat the analyses of columns (3), (6), (9), and (12), where we either cluster standard errors at the country level or look only at variables at the aggregate level.
Appendix A
A.1. The ordered response model
Because our dependent variable at the individual level is categorical and ordered, we use an ordered response model. To capture the repeated cross-sectional nature of our data-where households are different in each cross-section-we index individuals by i(t), where i(t) = 1, …, I and t = 1, …, T. More specifically, we estimate the following ordered logit model for individual i(t) residing in country j = 1, …, J at time t:
where k represents an index for the number of categories (where K = 4), μ k is the upper cut-point for category k, and y i(t)jt ⁎ is a latent dependent variable given by 19
where x jt is a vector of variables at the aggregate level, including our measure of fiscal decentralization, z i(t)jt is a vector of variables at the individual level, and β and γ are the vectors of parameters. The parameters η j and ϕ t are the country-specific fixed effects and wave fixed effects, respectively, and ε i(t)jt is a logistically distributed error term with mean zero and variance π 2 /3. The probability of individual i(t) of country j choosing category k conditional on x jt and z i(t)jt is given by
where F(⋅) denotes the logistic cumulative density function of ε i(t)jt . The corresponding log-likelihood function is given by
where θ ≡ [β γ η j ϕ t μ] ' is a row vector with parameters, and μ is the vector of cut-points. For identification purposes, we set the constant to zero. Maximizing (A.3) gives the estimates of the coefficient vectors β and γ, the fixed effects η j and ϕ t , and the cut-points μ k . Depending on the specification we may assume the fixed effects η j to be zero.
A.2 Descriptive statistics 19 The category y i(t)jt = 4 corresponds to the answer 'a great deal of confidence,' y i(t)jt = 3 to 'quite a lot of confidence,' y i(t)jt = 2 to 'not very much confidence,' and y i(t)jt = 1
to 'none at all.' The categories k = 1 and k = K = 4 (i.e., the extreme categories) are open-ended intervals with μ 0 → − ∞ and μ K → ∞. See Long (1997) for further details on the ordered logit model. 
